SITUATING “GROUPS” IN CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT:
INTERROGATING JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS ON ECONOMIC
RIGHTS, GENDER EQUALITY, AND GAY EQUALITY
Stuart Chinn ∗
The New Deal transformation in Commerce Clause and Due Process jurisprudence marked,
among other things, a shift in judicial attention from groups defined by economic relationships to
groups defined by social status. Hence, one might plausibly see judicial activism in defense of
freedom of contract during the Lochner-era subsequently giving way, in part, to the judicial
protection of racial minorities, women, and gay persons in the decades after Brown v. Board of
Education.
In this Article, I attempt to illuminate this shift in judicial attention by examining the Supreme
Court’s rhetoric surrounding groups in the context of the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours
regulations and the post-Brown v. Board of Education-era cases on gender and gay equality. I
situate my inquiry in the context of broader themes in American political thought, with particular
attention to the core concepts and principles of American liberalism. In examining the recurrent
modes of argument surrounding groups in these Supreme Court cases, I discuss how the Court’s
concept of groups—and how its views of American society more broadly—has varied in different
constitutional doctrinal contexts.
My examination of these cases yields two key findings. The first finding speaks to a similarity
across these contexts of Supreme Court jurisprudence: when confronted by reforms calling for
special or different legal treatment of specific groups, both pro-reform and anti-reform Supreme
Court Justices in these three doctrinal contexts put forth arguments about group-sameness and
group-difference. That is, group-sameness and group-difference arguments were deployed by
Justices on both sides of the various legal controversies in these doctrinal areas. The second
finding speaks to a difference between these doctrinal contexts: while arguments in defense of
special legal treatment for groups in the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours regulations were
linked to larger, broader, more systemic goals, no such sensibility informs the judicial protection of
groups in the post-Brown cases on gender and gay equality. Rather, in more recent years, the
judicial defense of groups largely proceeds from a judicial concern for only the groups in question.
Thus, we see in the more contemporary cases examples of judicial arguments about “societal
segmentation”—a significant mode of legal and political argument that, I assert, has appeared
episodically throughout American history. In the final Part, I set forth a more general definition of
societal segmentation arguments, and I discuss how notions of segmentation may be situated in
relation to the principles of American liberalism.
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INTRODUCTION
The New Deal era is commonly recognized as a crucial breakpoint
in American constitutional development for, among other things,
marking a transformative shift in the Supreme Court’s Commerce
1
Clause and Due Process jurisprudence. As many have noted, the
Supreme Court’s lessening concern with protecting economic rights
2
in cases such as West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, United States v. Carolene
3
4
Products Co., and United States v. Darby ultimately gave way, in part, to
judicial protection of the individual rights of racial minorities, women, and more recently gay persons. This marked shift in focus by the
judiciary from focusing on individuals and groups defined by economic relationships to focusing on individuals and groups defined by
social status was encouraged in the notable Footnote Four of the Car5
olene Products ruling. In an opinion otherwise devoted to the theme
of judicial deference toward legislation on economic matters, Justice
Harlan Stone hinted in Footnote Four’s memorable third paragraph
that heightened judicial scrutiny may be appropriate for laws that
targeted “religious,” “national,” or “racial” minorities, or for laws that
6
encompassed “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”
My primary goal in this Article is to further examine the substance
of this doctrinal shift suggested in the third paragraph of Footnote

1

2
3
4
5

6

See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 256–57 (1998); PAUL
BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 516, 549–50 (5th ed.
2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 640–41 (4th
ed. 2011); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117–20 (revised by Sanford Levinson, 2d ed. 1994); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 811–
17, 1352 (3d ed. 2000); 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1941–1953, at 32–38 (Stanley N.
Katz ed., 2006).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 (1980);
see also BREST, supra note 1, at 517–18 (suggesting that Footnote Four’s protection of the
rights of “discrete and insular” minorities offered “a new justification for judicial review of
legislation”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 712–13 (explaining the relationship between
Footnote Four and “heightened scrutiny for government actions discriminating against
racial and national origin minorities”); WIECEK, supra note 1, at 141–42 (citing concern
over the civil rights of minority populations as one reason for the Court’s rejection of
“classical legal thought” during this time period). On the rise of a new judicial concern
with protecting groups defined by racial, religious, and ethnic identity in the post-New
Deal era, see David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 743, 761–79 (1981).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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Four. In discussing this shift in judicial attention from groups defined by economic relationships to groups defined by social status, I
intend to offer a preliminary exploration of a significant element in
American political and legal thought that is present in one context
but absent in the other. I argue that the Court’s discussion of groups
and societal differentiation in its Lochner-era cases on economic rights
and its more recent cases on gender and gay equality reflect recognizably distinct judicial perspectives. In the former body of doctrine,
the Court linked the differential treatment of certain groups to larger
public or society-wide interests. In the more recent cases on gender
and gay equality, however, such arguments are much more subdued.
Indeed, in the gender and gay equality cases, the differential treatment of certain groups is mainly justified with reference to the
unique hardships and interests of those specific groups. This contrast
between more universalistic, public-regarding justifications versus
more group-specific justifications speaks, I believe, to a notion of societal segmentation that is present in the more recent cases. Segmentation arguments are a significant mode of argument that, I will suggest, have appeared episodically in different policy arenas and
different times in American political and legal thought.
In Part I, I set the context for my inquiry in discussing the scholarly literature surrounding American political “traditions.” This literature begins with the subject of liberalism, the political philosophy
that nearly all scholars consider dominant in American politics. But
alongside liberalism, I discuss its various competitor traditions, in addition to some of the more recent scholarship on liberalism that emphasizes its malleability and interconnectedness with other, sometimes conflicting, political ideological themes.
In discussing this scholarly literature, I also introduce two key
conceptual dichotomies that are implicated in the notion of societal
segmentation. These concepts are generally used in both descriptive
and normative ways, and have constituted elements of every major
tradition in American politics. The first dichotomy is the notion of
individualism versus the notion of emphasizing groups in thinking
about the constitutive units of American society. The second dichotomy speaks to competing notions of how American society is, or
should be, organized: an emphasis on sameness and relative equality
among members of the political community in terms of legal, political, and social status versus an emphasis on entrenched differentiation and differential treatment for various individuals and groups in
the political community.
In Part I, I very briefly discuss how each of the major American
political traditions has intersected with these conceptual dichotomies.
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I also set the stage for the discussion in Parts II and III, where I begin
to interrogate the relative importance of individuals/groups and
sameness/differentiation in two constitutional doctrinal areas: the
Supreme Court’s Lochner-era cases on economic rights (discussed in
Part II) and its more recent cases on gender and gay equality (discussed in Part III). The judicial rhetoric in these various cases will
not directly clarify the relative importance of the individuals/groups
and sameness/differentiation conceptual dichotomies at these different moments in constitutional history. Still, by examining patterns in
how the Court has discussed groups across these cases—and by seeing
how the Court has deployed arguments about group difference and
group sameness in the contexts of economic rights, gender rights,
and gay rights—hints of the greater influence of the segmentation
ideal in the more contemporary cases will become clear.
Thus, beginning in Parts II and III, but continuing in a more extended discussion in Part IV, I flesh out the two primary claims of this
Article: first, the Court’s more recent cases on gender and gay equality reflect a greater judicial acceptance—relative to the Lochner-era
Court—of approaching certain legal issues with a presumption of
7
greater segmentation in American society. In fleshing out this claim,
I tentatively offer a more general theory of segmentation as a mode
of political and legal argument, and discuss its broader applicability
to other contexts.
My second primary claim concerns the status of liberalism. As discussed in Part I, an acceptance of fixed, unchanging groups sits in
tension with the emphasis on individualism at the heart of liberal political philosophy. To the extent judicial rhetoric can be taken as fairly representative of broader trends in American political thought, at
least among political elites, the greater judicial willingness to recognize segmented groups in its opinions reflects the greater comfort
within contemporary American political thought of moving to the
outer edges of liberalism. Thus, I conclude the Article by discussing,
in Part IV, an oddity about contemporary rights jurisprudence: the
Court is deeply committed to deploying a non-liberal concept, such
as the social group, to achieve liberal ends including achieving great7

My examination of groups in judicial rhetoric in this paper is limited to two kinds of
groups: groups constituted by professional identity or employment in the Lochner era,
and groups constituted by social identity and social status in the post-Brown era. While
the doctrine surrounding these groups has played an out-sized role in American constitutional development, this does not exhaust the entire range of important groups in American politics and society, of course. Corporations, for example, are also commonly recognized as a kind of social group as well. LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 2 (1987).
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er freedom and emancipation for certain disadvantaged individuals.
This intertwining of illiberal and liberal concepts in turn suggests, I
believe, a continuing development that will ultimately lead to a greater acceptance of social groups and group difference within American
liberalism, and a continued adaptation of liberal ideology.
Finally, let me offer a quick comment on case selection: since the
context for my inquiry is limited to only three significant doctrinal
areas, I should mention some reasons for my choice to focus on these
8
particular areas. The Lochner -era cases on economic rights and the
9
post-Brown cases on gender and gay equality are appropriate for
analysis, and for comparison to each other, for two simple reasons.
First, each context saw legal reforms at stake that aimed to improve
the rights and entitlements of groups perceived by many to be relatively disadvantaged under the status quo. To invoke some terminology that will be introduced in Part I, one might plausibly say that both
doctrinal areas involved beneficial or benign class legislation. Second, each context stands out as a conspicuous and significant period
of judicial assertiveness regarding group or class interests. The first
period saw the Court responding negatively, and conspicuously, to
legislative enactments aiming to regulate economic relationships for
certain kinds of employees and their employers. The latter period
saw the Court elaborating in a similarly conspicuous manner upon
the rights of women and gay persons that went beyond prior doctrine
and established federal and state statutes.
There are a number of other avenues—whether judicial or nonjudicial—where these themes might be explored. Indeed, I might
note one prominent omission in the case discussion below: I have little discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence on race in the years prior
10
to and during the Jim Crow era. These cases constitute some of the
strongest historical support for the existence of an “ascriptive11
hierarchical” political tradition, or a commitment to social group

8
9
10

11

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
For instances of judicial antipathy, sometimes explicit and sometimes more implicit, to
African-American rights, see, for example, Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
581 (1872). For a general discussion of a heightened conservatism from the Court in the
post-Reconstruction era, see STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF
POLITICAL CHANGE, 65–108, 193–236 (2014).
See infra 37 and accompanying text.
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inequality. As such, these cases exhibit a judicial assumption of entrenched, social group differentiation in American society. Furthermore, beyond the omission of certain cases, the judiciary itself certainly holds no monopoly on discussions of the concepts and ideals I
am investigating; an examination of legislative and executive actions
would also be relevant to an inquiry regarding how groups are discussed and treated in American law and politics.
Notwithstanding the above, however, I limit my discussion in Parts
II and III to the Lochner-era economic rights cases and the gender
and gay equality cases. My focus on Supreme Court doctrine stems
from the fact that the Court has a particular institutional orientation
toward justifying and elaborating upon its actions in its opinions that
is sometimes absent in the actions of the elected branches. Because
the concepts surrounding group rights and social segmentation speak
to foundational and abstract themes in American political thought,
they seem particularly likely to intersect with constitutional doctrine
in significant ways.
Further, in focusing on judicial cases dealing with class legislation
benefitting disadvantaged groups, we might also observe some distinctive arguments justifying or critiquing the targeted treatment of
certain groups that are distinct from arguments in those contexts
where racial and gender hierarchies are being promoted—the latter of
12
which have been ably explored by others. Finally, my targeted focus
on only the aforementioned doctrinal areas stems from the presumption that instances of judicial assertiveness will tend to force underlying ideological commitments and presumptions more to the surface.
When the judiciary orients itself in opposition to existing statutory
law or case law in highly visible political controversies, this political
context will tend to make the Court more inclined to offer elaborate
and substantive justifications for its decisions. That is, contexts of judicial assertiveness seem particularly likely to encourage the Court to
be more self-conscious and explicit about its ideological presump13
tions, and about its role in relation to the elected branches. In con12
13

See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997); see also infra Part I.
Thus, even among the Court’s Lochner-era cases on economic rights and its post-Brown
cases on noneconomic rights, I have focused on those cases where the Court explicitly
spoke to the individual/group and equality/differentiation concepts under discussion.
Other cases from these eras touch upon these themes in less explicit ways, of course, but
my choice of cases proceeds from the assumption that greater value—at least at this stage
of the inquiry—lies in tracing the interaction between certain ideological concepts and
the judiciary’s understanding of its institutional role in those opinions that deal with these issues more explicitly.
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trast, I suspect that instances of the judiciary affirming or reconciling
itself to prior legislative action—as was the case with some of the key
14
Jim Crow-era cases —will tend to provide judicial actors with a
broader range of politically plausible judicial responses. Majority
opinions in such cases may be narrow or broad in scope, deeply rea15
soned or shallowly reasoned. Thus, focusing on cases where the
Court’s political capital might be at greatest risk seems an appropriate starting point for examining key aspects of American political
thought, and how certain ideas intersect with the judiciary’s understanding of its role in American democracy.
I. INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS AND EQUALITY/DIFFERENTIATION IN
AMERICA’S POLITICAL TRADITIONS
In discussing the Footnote Four shift, others have examined the
Court’s change in focus from economic to noneconomic rights in
16
doctrinal or normative-legal theoretical terms. As noted above, we
might gain a different sense of the Footnote’s significance by focusing on some of the more abstract concepts implicated in the constitutional treatment of groups. But necessarily prior to that exercise,
some clarification and discussion is warranted regarding the concepts
themselves that will structure the subsequent case analysis. The particular focus below will be on two key conceptual dichotomies. The
first is the ideal of individualism set against an emphasis on groups.
The second dichotomy is the ideal and legal promotion of relative
equality and sameness among members of the polity, set against the
opposing ideal and legal promotion of entrenched differentiations
within the polity. I will flesh out both conceptual dichotomies in the

14

15
16

The Court did strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases, though
that was a statute that had enjoyed very little political support. CHINN, supra note 10, at
77.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
10–14 (1999) (explaining these different modes of adjudication).
ELY, supra note 5, at 75–77, 151–53; see also BREST, supra note 1, at 517–18 (explaining that
after the Court moved away from judicial review of economic legislation, “protecting democracy” and “protecting civil rights” were new justifications for reviewing other types of
legislation); WIECEK, supra note 1, at 136–42 (noting that Footnote Four “set the agenda
for the Court” during this period and highlighted the concern of some Justices that legislatures could not “be counted on to protect discrete and insular minorities”); Terrance
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164 (1977) (“More recently, concern has been directed toward threats to . . . noneconomic rights.”); David A.
Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1253–1254 (2010) (describing the Court’s shift away from the Lochner-era decisions, which focused on economic
rights).
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context of the major “traditions” in American political thought. 17
That exercise, in turn, will help provide content to the notion of societal segmentation, the latter of which I will emphasize in the subsequent parts of this Article as a key element of the Footnote Four shift.
A. Liberalism
Liberal political philosophy is generally understood to be at the
center of American political thought; hence, most scholarly discussions of American political ideologies or traditions begin with an examination of it. By “liberalism,” most commentators on American
18
politics have a John Locke-inspired version of liberalism in mind,
emphasizing some mix of the following key commitments and ideals:
individualism, individual rights, a limited state, “atomistic” social
freedom (i.e., negative liberty), and commitments to property rights
19
and market capitalism. Furthermore, most also emphasize a notion
of equality or universalism lying at the core of liberalism, with respect
20
to individual rights and entitlements. This also leads to an accompanying emphasis on government by consent and representative government; so long as individual rights are respected, the basic equality
among members of a liberal political community leads to some form
21
of majority rule. At the same time, of course, conceptions of liberal17

18

19

20

21

I use the term political “tradition” in the manner defined by Rogers Smith: “(1) a world
view or ideology that defines basic political and economic institutions, the persons eligible to participate in them, and the roles or rights to which they are entitled, and (2) institutions and practices embodying and reproducing such precepts.” SMITH, supra note 12,
at 507 n.5.
For a brief summary discussion of John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government within
the context of a broader discussion of American liberalism, see JAMES P. YOUNG,
RECONSIDERING AMERICAN LIBERALISM: THE TROUBLED ODYSSEY OF THE LIBERAL IDEA 23–
39 (1996).
The key text in this literature is LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 12–18, 55–
60, 62–64, 128–34 (1955). Other key works include: J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN
PERSUASION: REMAKING AMERICAN LIBERALISM 48 (1993); CAROL A. HORTON, RACE AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 5 (2005); SMITH, supra note 12, at 8, 18, 35–39, 507
n.4; ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed.,
1985); YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6–7, 327–29. The Lockean liberalism discussed here
should be distinguished from “legal liberalism,” the latter of which Laura Kalman describes as a faith in the potential of the judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—to
bring about progressive change on behalf of more disempowered social groups. LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2, 247 n.1 (1996).
HARTZ, supra note 19, at 56, 205–06; DESMOND KING, IN THE NAME OF LIBERALISM:
ILLIBERAL SOCIAL POLICY IN THE USA AND BRITAIN 7–8 (1999); SMITH, LIBERALISM, supra
note 19, at 18, 35–37; YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6, 328.
GREENSTONE, supra note 19, at 48; HARTZ, supra note 19, at 56–62; HORTON, supra note
19, at 5; SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS, supra note 12, at 507 n.5.
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ism also emphasize a sense of cautiousness and wariness about majority rule—hence the aforementioned focus on individual rights (especially property rights) and commitments to constitutionalism and the
22
rule of law.
Undoubtedly different scholars would emphasize some concepts
and deemphasize others among those I mention. Still, there are
clear convergences in the scholarly literature, and much of that convergence reflects a point of intellectual history: the preceding discussion, and the authors cited within it, rely upon, critique, or are otherwise in conversation with the work of Louis Hartz. Hartz’s key
claim was that a pervasive liberal political tradition exists in America
due to the absence of feudalism in our history and historical con23
sciousness. The Hartzian thesis, as noted in more detail below, has
been subject to sustained scholarly critique. Yet, despite its potential
shortcomings, the Hartzian thesis retains enough significance to remain a starting point for many discussions of American political
thought.
For our purposes, we might extract from the preceding discussion
two key concepts implicated in most conceptions of American liberalism that bear directly on the constitutional doctrinal shifts that are
our focus. The first, which is emphasized by all scholars of American
liberalism, is relatively uncontroversial: liberalism’s emphasis on individuals as opposed to groups or classes. It is the individual that remains the unit of analysis within liberalism—the entity entitled to
rights, and the key constitutive unit of civil society and the legalpolitical system. Indeed, liberalism’s emphasis on individualism was,
in Hartz’s estimation, crucial in explaining the absence of more economic class-based politics in American history; the myth of Horatio
Alger-like upward economic mobility, so his argument went, proved
too attractive an aspiration for American’s working class. That is, less
wealthy individuals preferred to channel their energies in pursuit of
the individualistic, Alger myth over class-based political mobilization
24
and collective action.
22
23

24

See YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6, 328.
HARTZ, supra note 18, at 3–14, 20. On this point, Hartz drew on a Tocquevillian insight:
“The Americans have this great advantage, that they attained democracy without the sufferings of a democratic revolution and that they were born equal instead of becoming
so.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 480 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1966); see also YOUNG, supra note 18, at 100 (noting that Hartz drew upon
the influence of de Tocqueville as the “starting point for his theory of liberal consensus”).
HARTZ, supra note 19, at 6, 111–13, 199–200, 203–11. The theme of individualism has
also been at the core of non-American versions of liberalism as well. See, e.g., MICHAEL
FREEDEN, IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL THEORY: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 144–45, 153,
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A second and perhaps more contestable liberal concept worth
emphasizing is the notion of equality. As previously noted, precisely
what makes American society liberal, according to Hartz, is the absence of permanent feudal classes. Thus, while individuals in a liberal society would want and expect differences to emerge among themselves with respect to wealth and property, there would also be an
expectation of equal rights and equal legal entitlements for all full
members of the political community. There may also be an emphasis
on the relative equality of social status for all members of the political
community as well; notwithstanding substantial economic differences
that may exist among them, citizens in a liberal polity would not view
25
those differences as fundamental or permanently entrenched. This
pervasive equality across individuals marked a point of concern for
Hartz, and at an earlier time, Alexis de Tocqueville as well. Both
warned of the specter of a tyranny of the majority, where such equali26
ty might lead to a problem of conformity and the stifling of dissent.
One might say then that both theorists noted ambivalence, or even a
hostility in American political thought—at least at a conceptual level—toward entrenched, permanent differentiation in society.
B. Civic Republicanism
While liberalism remains central to discussions of American political traditions, civic republicanism has often been invoked as a competitor of sorts to it. Trying to define the contours of civic republicanism would be nearly as difficult as the analogous chore for
liberalism, but at least with respect to the two items emphasized
above—individualism and equality—one might roughly sketch out an
alternative perspective.
In contrast to liberalism’s focus on the individual and individual
social freedom, many have emphasized the civic republican focus on
the normative ideal of an active citizenry, oriented toward serving a
larger common good or the general welfare of the polity. Thus, the
civic republican vision places relatively greater emphasis on the duties

25
26

185–86 (1996). Notably, Freeden has also discussed an emphasis on community within
non-American versions of liberalism that soften the latter’s focus on the individual; he
thus argues that considerations of societal or the common good can be incorporated
within liberal ideology. Id. at 203–06, 249–50, 254–58. That said, even these less individualistic forms of liberalism seem to remain some distance from whole-hearted acceptance
of social group differentiation and societal segmentation—the latter of which clearly
seems to reside at the outer edges of or outside American liberalism.
See supra note 20.
HARTZ, supra note 19, at 11, 57, 254–56; TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 254–56.
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of citizenship and on the polity as an entity worthy of consideration
in its own right. This is a theme that J.G.A. Pocock traced from Re27
naissance political thought to the American context; that Gordon
Wood emphasized as an enduring theme in the American Revolu28
tionary era; and that contemporary political theorists like Michael
Sandel invoked as a normative prescription for the ills of current pol29
itics.
Second, with respect to liberalism’s commitment to equality and
social undifferentiation, some scholars have emphasized a civic republican view that diverges in key respects. A sense of equality
among citizens also underlies many discussions of civic republican30
ism; but, equality in the latter is sometimes accompanied by the
theme of a persistent divide, and the potential for conflict between
31
“the people” and “elites.” Hence there is a basic and fundamental
27
28

29

30

31

See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 506–07, 550–52 (1975).
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 58 (3d
prtg. 1987) (describing the common good in the American colonial context as follows:
“This common interest was not, as we might today think of it, simply the sum or consensus of the particular interests that made up the community. It was rather an entity in itself, prior to and distinct from the various private interests of groups and individuals . . . .
[P]olitics was conceived to be not the reconciling but the transcending of the different
interests of the society in the search for the single common good . . . .”); see also id. at 53–
65 (discussing republicanism’s focus on the public good, and the ways in which this informed Americans’ conception of how their society should operate during the Revolution).
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 3–7 (2d prtg. 1996) (contrasting contemporary liberalism, which the author
argues is ill-equipped to address the sense of disempowerment afflicting public life, with
republican political theory, which “may offer a corrective to our impoverished civic life,”
in light of its emphasis on civic considerations). On republicanism in general, see Daniel
T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 18–20 (1992); see also
SMITH, supra note 12, at 15, 507 n.5 (treating republican traditions as “grounded on popular sovereignty exercised via institutitions not just of formal consent but of mass selfgovernance”).
See SMITH, supra note 12, at 37 (explaining that democratic republicanism can have
strongly egalitarian implications); WOOD, supra note 28, at 70–75 (discussing how the
Americans’ adoption of republicanism led to a fundamental change in their social structure, as the principle of equality became central to the governing of society).
Wood discusses this theme among key anti-federalist figures during the Founding Era,
who he views as legitimate spokesmen for the republican tradition. See WOOD, supra note
28, at 513–24, 562–64 (discussing the anti-federalists’ pervasive distrust in what they considered to be an essentially aristocratic government established under the Constitution,
and the ways in which their rejection of this new system compelled Federalists to articulate how and why it was “strictly republican”); see also POCOCK, supra note 27, at 507;
WOOD, supra 28, at 57–58 (discussing how republicanism ushered a new era of cooperation between rulers and citizens); John P. McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 297 (2001) (arguing that Niccolò Machiavelli theorized for extensive institutional and cultural means of popular
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societal division that accompanies some strains of civic republican
thought that is in tension with core components of liberal ideology.
Among those interested in exploring the historical role of civic
republican thought in American history, few claim that its influence
has been nearly as significant as liberalism. Daniel Rodgers notes
that among scholars of the revolutionary and early national eras, few
“doubted that liberalism ultimately swept up the nation’s economic,
political, and cultural life. The project [of these scholars] was to stay
32
the hand of the Hartzian moment, not to deny it.” Still, certain elements of civic republican thought undoubtedly live on in our political vocabulary, and one might find connections between its themes
33
and other bodies of American thought such as populism.
C. Ascriptive Hierarchies and Multiple Traditions
While much of American politics can be explained with reference
to either a liberal or civic republican political tradition, much else
remains that seems to fall outside these two bodies of thought.
Hence one of the strongest critiques pressed against the Hartzian
thesis stems from an emphasis on the politics of exclusion in American history. A long and very extensive history of law and politics centered on discriminatory and exclusionary state actions against racial
minorities, women, and gay persons in particular raises serious questions about Hartz’s claims. How pervasive could the liberal commitment to individuals, individual rights, and universal equality be if
such stark social segmentation and group-based oppression has
played a major role in our history? Focusing on doctrinal developments in citizenship law, Rogers Smith asserts that such group-based

32

33

control over political elites). This basic idea was a notable component of Jacksonian political thought. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 1815–1848, at 380–81, 501, 582 (2007) (describing the
Jacksonian emphasis on popular rule set in opposition to the pernicious influence of special interests and elites); WHITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE
DEMOCRATS 138–39 (2003); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 513–14 (1st ed. 2005) (explaining that the Jacksonian democratic
emphasis on popular rule opposed the pernicious influence of special interests and
elites). This idea also appeared within Populism as well. See MICHAEL KAZIN, THE
POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1995) (“That is the most basic and telling definition of populism: a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a
noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving
and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.”).
Rodgers, supra note 29, at 24. Rodgers does note, however, that scholars who studied republicanism in labor history tended to see its influence extending further across American history. Id. at 30.
On the rhetoric of populism, see generally KAZIN, supra note 31.
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exclusion and inequalities are so pervasive that they encompass nothing less than a tradition in American political thought separate from
34
liberalism and civic republicanism. He labels it a tradition of “as35
criptive hierarchies.” Indeed, it is the presence of “multiple traditions” in the American political imagination and vocabulary that, according to Smith, allows for change and innovation in American
36
political thought. As politicians cobble together various strands of
thought from each of these traditions into coherent narratives of citizenship—in order to bring together majority voting coalitions—new
37
combinations of ideals and commitments can be created. Thus, the
multiple traditions approach explains the presence of more exclusionary modes of thought in our history, and allows for interpretations of American political thought encompassing change and innovation, which might seemingly be precluded by the implication of
persistent continuity within the Hartzian thesis of a rather hegemonic
American liberal tradition.
D. Innovation and Flexibility in Liberalism
Thus, a crucial fault line might be drawn between a liberal perspective and the ascriptive-hierarchical perspective with respect to the
two core concepts I have emphasized. While the liberal perspective
emphasizes individuals and the ideals of relative equality and sameness, the ascriptive-hierarchical perspective emphasizes clearlydefined groups or classes of persons, and allows for differential (and
subordinating) treatment of those groups or classes.
Subsequent to Hartz, however, other theorists of American liberalism have set forth more nuanced conceptions of liberalism that challenge such a clear distinction between it and the more exclusionary
aspects of American politics. These post-Hartzians have emphasized
the flexibility of liberal ideals and liberal language, with at least two
significant addendums to the Hartzian perspective.
The first addendum is a challenge to Hartz’s view of liberalism as
a static, relatively unchanging philosophy. To the contrary, scholars
such as J. David Greenstone and Stephen Skowronek have emphasized how the complexity of concepts within American liberalism allows creative political entrepreneurs to reshape those concepts. The
consequence of such conceptual reshaping and transformation, they
34
35
36
37

SMITH, supra note 10, at 6, 8–9, 30–39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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argue, allows for the possibility of real conflict and real development
within liberal political thought. Greenstone, for example, discussed a
“bipolarity” in American liberalism between a “reform” variant of liberalism “concerned primarily with the development of the faculties of
individuals,” and a “humanist” variant of liberalism “concerned pri38
marily with the satisfaction of the preferences of individuals.” These
two variants allowed for points of disagreements to occur even among
individuals all committed to liberalism, and for innovation to occur
within liberalism as well—the latter of which Greenstone explores in
39
the case of Lincoln.
In a similar vein, Skowronek has focused on the example of President Woodrow Wilson and traced how President Wilson took conventionally understood liberal concepts such as “nationalism” and “democracy” and innovatively used them to promote racist political
40
goals. Skowronek refers to such acts as the reassociation of ideas
with different programmatic purposes, and he views this as more than
41
just instrumental, strategic action by clever political entrepreneurs.
The case of President Wilson demonstrates, he argues, that such acts
of conceptual innovation are capable of helping to constitute new el42
ements of the American political tradition.
The second addendum to Hartz, oriented more directly as a response to the multiple traditions thesis, is to challenge the characterization of liberalism and ascriptive-hierarchical ideology as encompassing separate traditions. Contrary to Smith’s multiple traditions
approach, some post-Hartzian theorists acknowledge the possibility of
inegalitarian and ascriptive-hierarchical ideals existing within liberal
43
ideology. How then might illiberal political outcomes—such as exclusionary laws aimed at racial minorities and women—coexist or
even be facilitated by liberal ideals and commitments? These postHartzians emphasize at least two possible mechanisms. First, scholars
have emphasized that liberal ideals and language have often been
deployed in ways consistent with, or supportive of, inegalitarian

38
39
40
41
42
43

GREENSTONE, supra note 19, at 6.
Id. at 6–7, 33, 48–50, 236–43.
Stephen Skowronek, The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the
American Political Tradition, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (2006).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 385, 385–86, 388–89, 393–95, 398–400.
See, e.g., KING, supra note 20; Ira Katznelson, Books in Review, 27 POL. THEORY 565, 568–70
(1999) (reviewing ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (1997)).
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goals. 44 For example, a liberal polity might generate illiberal outcomes through exclusionary standards regulating membership into
the political community. Those who are deemed “full” members
might enjoy a full array of liberal rights protections and enjoy the expectation of full equality. Those who fall short of full membership
for whatever reason, however, might be deemed less “fit” for such a
status, and excluded from these benefits in a manner consistent with
45
liberal ideals.
Second, a liberal polity might generate illiberal outcomes through
one of the core institutions of liberal ideology: representativedemocratic government. One then might lay at least partial responsibility for the appearance of illiberal, exclusionary statutes in American history upon liberalism, since such statutes were created via liber46
Hence the consequences of liberal ideals can
al institutions.
sometimes be seen as consistent with illiberal political outcomes.
The flexibility and complexity of liberalism emphasized above has
led some post-Hartzians to offer a view of the liberal political tradition that is more amorphous than what Hartz imagined. Rather than
viewing it as a discrete set of ideals and commitments, some scholars
47
view it as more akin to a grammar. Stears summarizes this view as
follows:
[T]he American liberal tradition is in essence a prolonged argument
about a series of shared but indeterminate ideals. The bare outline of

44

45

46

47

See, e.g., HORTON, supra note 19, at 4–5, 37, 96 (explaining that the liberal position
“blended easily with a newly expansive and more severely hierarchical conception of
race”); KING, supra note 20, at 10–23 (describing possible justifications for illiberal social
policies within a liberal framework); Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (“Even when conceptualized as neutral rules of the game, liberalism’s ordinary functioning can, under
some circumstances, advance and thus bond with nonliberal and illiberal impulses of various kinds.”).
See KING, supra note 20, at 11–13 (discussing the emphasis that liberal democracy and its
theorists place on assessing who should be excuded from or included in the polity);
Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (“Doctrinally, key liberal thinkers elaborated standards
for inclusion in a liberal polity based either on levels of rationality . . . or on compounds
of rationality and ascription . . . .”).
See Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (asserting that key liberal institutional inventions
such as political representation and political consent by the governed have led to the expression of majority’s exclusivist and racist preferences).
See, e.g., HORTON, supra note 19, at 5 (arguing that treating liberalism as a flexible discourse is consistent with long accepted theories of cultural practice); Gary Gerstle, The
Protean Character of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1043, 1045–46 (1994) (noting
the “malleability” of the liberal tradition); Marc Stears, The Liberal Tradition and the Politics
of Exclusion, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 97 (2007) (noting that “liberalism is essentially a
loose set of interrelated general ideas” and that “[t]he American liberal tradition . . . is
essentially a shared argument rather than a set of clear, coherent, and consistent beliefs”).
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these ideals—including liberty, equality, and a worry about excessive
power—is consistent over time, and it plays a vital role in shaping the political identity of the nation and ensuring a remarkable continuity of
popular aspiration over time. But the precise meaning and concrete political implications of such concepts as liberty, equality, and power have
48
been the subject of continuous contestation.

Yet, as powerful as these post-Hartzian arguments may be, a point
worth emphasizing—and one that all of them seemingly concede ex49
plicitly or implicitly —is that even a flexible liberalism cannot be allencompassing. To see all events in American politics as inescapably
leading back to liberalism risks either ignoring or minimizing certain
events (the critique that prompted the multiple traditions thesis itself) or expanding the meaning of liberalism to the point where it
fails to hold much analytical value.
My own inquiry begins with a slightly different point of departure
relative to some of the post-Hartzians; my emphasis is less on the inherent suppleness and complexity of liberalism and more on those
issues that probe at the outer boundaries of liberalism. That is, my
interest is on those political commitments that—even if they may not
lie wholly outside liberalism—may lie further from core liberal concepts, or may be genuine innovations upon core liberal concepts, or
may even be in tension with core liberal concepts.
Thus in Parts II and III, I investigate two bodies of constitutional
doctrine that lie on either side of a break-point in American constitutional development. Ultimately, this analysis in Parts II and III will
aid in illuminating the Court’s varied approach to dealing with
groups and societal differentiation in different doctrinal and historical contexts.
That said, let me note two obstacles that may complicate this task
from the outset. First, the judicial rhetoric within the cases will not
directly address the individualism versus group dichotomy. I have deliberately focused on judicial opinions that explicitly address the interests of groups or classes, thereby perhaps stacking the deck toward
examining cases that cut against the individualistic focus of liberalism. Further, even with this potential stacking of the deck, one might
still easily take the contrarian position and see the judicial concern
for groups in these cases as merely a proxy for its more basic concern
for individual rights. Indeed the “contrarian” view is perhaps the
48
49

Stears, supra note 47, at 93–94 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Gerstle, supra note 47, at 1046 (acknowledging the limitations of liberalism’s flexibility); Katznelson, supra note 43, at 568 (explaining the complications that an allencompassing conception of liberalism encounters when racism becomes a part of the
discussion).
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more conventional view of the gender equality and gay equality cases;
arguably, the Court’s protection of women and gay persons as classes
in these cases should be seen, first and foremost, as merely a means
toward the judicial protection of the rights of individual women and
50
individual gay persons. At the very least then, the opinions themselves will not, on their surface, directly settle questions about whether the Court has cared more about groups or individuals at different
moments in time.
Second and relatedly, the question of whether the Court is more
inclined to emphasize sameness and equality or entrenched differentiation in these opinions is also made difficult by the Justices’ divergence on baseline assessments. As discussed in more detail below, oftentimes a given Justice’s openness to “differential” legal treatment
for a given group hinged greatly on that Justice’s evaluation of the initial status quo baseline. Depending upon whether a Justice felt that
a given group enjoyed a rough parity with comparable groups, that
Justice would or would not ultimately endorse differential treatment
for the group in question. Thus, given that a Justice’s intuitive analysis of status quo conditions weighed so heavily in their analysis of
group rights, a superficial reading of these cases is unlikely to tell us
whether liberal ideology (more equality-focused) or a non-liberal
ideology (more open to differentiation) is really structuring the
Court’s analysis in these cases.
Nevertheless, in Parts II and III below, I proceed by examining
cases where groups articulated certain rights, and I interrogate the
Court’s rhetoric and analysis surrounding the “sameness” or “difference” between those groups and other relevant groups. I catalogue
the array of sameness-arguments and difference-arguments made in
the context of the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours legislation,
50

In J.E.B. v. Alabama, Justice Anthony Kennedy makes this comment in his concurrence:
The Equal Protection Clause and our constitutional tradition are based on the
theory that an individual possesses rights that are protected against lawless action
by the government. The neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause, extending its guarantee to ‘any person,’ reveals its concern with rights of individuals, not
groups (though group disabilities are sometimes the mechanism by which the
State violates the individual right in question). ‘At the heart of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must
treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial [or] sexual . . . class.’
511 U.S. 127, 152–53 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)); see also Mark G. Yudof,
Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discriminiation: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1385 (1990) (arguing that equal protection
is for individuals—with group membership being an incidential concern—and in fact
“[t]he equal protection clause makes no mention of groups”).
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and the post-Brown-era cases on gender and gay equality. This analysis will provide a foundation for subsequent discussion in Part IV on
the relative importance of individual versus group and sameness versus differentiation ideals in the Court’s jurisprudence from these two
eras. I argue that we can indeed detect a significant, but subtle difference in the Court’s understanding of group rights across these
cases, and that this difference stems from the judiciary’s changed receptivity to segmentation concerns. Finally, in Part IV, I will elaborate
on this distinction and flesh out the concept of segmentation as a distinctive mode of political and legal argument.
II. THE IMPARTIAL STATE
From the late nineteenth century to the New Deal, the Court positioned itself in opposition to federal and state laws seeking to regulate, among other things, maximum hours and minimum wages for
employees in various occupations. The Court was largely hostile to
such laws, striking many of them down for violating rights protected
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A conventional interpretation of these cases treats them as evidence of the Court promoting laissez-faire values and the interests of
51
business. However, a more convincing line of scholarship identifies
a different analytical thread running through them. To these “revisionist” scholars, the Court’s Lochner-era cases reflected, above all else,
a strain of Jacksonian political thought focused on the maintenance
52
of an “impartial state.” An impartial state was desirable and necessary to prevent the proliferation of “class legislation” where through
its laws, the state would grant special privileges and favors to specific
classes of citizens, to the detriment of other citizens. A desire for
equality in how the state treated its citizens was the normative goal of
the Jacksonian-impartial state ideal. The Court did allow for exceptions, however. If a law sought to single out a particular class or
group for a benefit or burden, the law could be justified as within the
state’s legitimate police powers if it served the public interest in pro51
52

For a discussion of this view, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–4 (1993).
My use of the term “impartial state” in this Part, and my use of “partial state” in Part III, is
descriptive; these terms are not meant to be taken as normative evaluations of the judiciary’s actions in these two periods. That is, as a historical matter, the “impartial state” ideal structured a world-view many Lochner-era judges shared. In contrast, for a more normatively driven use and discussion of these terms in doctrinal contexts that overlap with
some of the cases that I discuss, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 3–7,
24–25, 75–81, 347, 350–53 (1993).
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moting the health, safety, or general well-being of either the broader
public or the group in question (if, say, the group in question were
53
employed in a particularly dangerous occupation). As discussed below, we do find the ideals and concerns of the impartial state perspective within the rhetoric of anti-reform judicial opinions during this
period.
The endorsement of an impartial state ideal in some of the judicial opinions from the Lochner era might be seen as clear support for
the Hartzian claim of a liberal consensus in America, at least among
judicial actors. A significant judicial fear did exist of state and federal
legislation recognizing and entrenching class differentiation and
segmentation in society; hence Court majorities at this time felt that
the peculiar duty of the Court was to enforce equality with respect to
how the state treated individuals. Indeed, Hartzian-liberal ideals and
commitments seem to have held sway among a majority of the Supreme Court at this time, with regard to these cases. And yet, as evidenced in part by the fact that the Court allowed for differential legal
treatment for certain groups during this period, other strains of
American political thought can be glimpsed in the rhetoric of both
the anti- and pro-reform voices on the Court as well.
In the following parts, I draw from the economic rights cases of
this era where either the majority or the dissenting opinions engaged
in some explicit discussion of class or group interests. What emerges
from the opinions is that both anti- and pro-reform Justices deployed
arguments about group sameness and difference. That is, when con-

53

See GILLMAN, supra note 51, at 1–4; see also id. at 10–14, 54–55 (arguing that “the Lochner
era represented a serious, principled effort to maintain one of the central distinctions in
nineteenth-century constitutional law—the distinction between valid economic regulation, on the one hand, and invalid ‘class’ legislation, on the other”); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 298, 305–14 (1985) (explaining that under laissezfaire economics, only certain kinds of government interference were permissible); Alan
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM.
HIST. 751, 752–56, 758–60, 763–66, 771 (1967) (describing Cooley’s conception of a
“constitutional government” and noting that Cooley’s writings “applied the term constitutional only to those governments [who] . . . defined ‘the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights and shield them against the exercise of arbitrary power”); Charles
W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971–74, 979–81, 994–
95, 1004–05 (1975) (describing post-Civil War constitutional controversies and noting
that the Court had “both the power and the opportunity to forge new doctrine and fix
new boundaries between the public and private sectors”); Yudof, supra note 50, at 1368–
71 (analyzing the Equal Protection Clause to illustrate an instance when the government
was permitted to “employ protective measures” to benefit a specific group, even as it “aspire[d] to a more global concept of constitutional equality”).
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fronted by reforms promoting certain group interests, Justices both
favorable and opposed to the reform discussed the groups in question by emphasizing its similarity and its difference from other groups
in society. But the payoff from the discussion below is not merely to
demonstrate a diversity of arguments in the Court’s opinions. More
than this, the analysis provides a baseline from which to contrast the
post-Brown jurisprudence on noneconomic rights that would appear
decades later. Even though both the Locher-era and post-Brown-era
cases dealt with group interests, I will argue that the latter dealt with
group interests in a markedly different way. After discussing both the
anti- and pro-reform perspectives on economic rights below, I conclude this Part with a brief discussion of the “universalistic” approach
to group rights in these cases to help set up a more extended, subsequent discussion of how they diverge from the gender and gay equality cases that are the focus of Part III.
A. Anti-Reform Arguments on Economic Rights
When confronted by federal and state statutes seeking to regulate
the wages and hours of certain employees, those Supreme Court Justices predisposed toward an anti-reform perspective predictably emphasized the inherent sameness of the groups in question, relative to
other groups. Because the groups in question were no different from
anyone else, these Justices argued, they should not get the benefit (or
burden, depending upon one’s perspective) of specific legislative
regulations governing their relationship with their employer. This
was an argument directly in line with the impartial state ideal.
Thus in the Lochner case itself, the Supreme Court struck down a
New York law providing for maximum hours for bakers as a violation
54
of the freedom of the contract. Justice Rufus Peckham’s opinion for
the majority emphasized that bakers as a class were in no obvious way
disadvantaged in their ability to bargain with their employers over the
terms of their labor. As he stated:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence
and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they
are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the
protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of
55
judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state.

There was nothing particularly dangerous about the profession of a
baker, and the public interest was not otherwise implicated in the
54
55

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
Id. at 57.
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context of baker employment. 56 Hence bakers as a class should not
be treated differently from other classes of workers.
A similar sensibility appears among anti-reform Justices in the
context of wages and hours legislation for female workers. In Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital, a majority of the Court struck down a minimum
wage law for women and minors in the District of Columbia for infringing upon the freedom of contract, as protected in the Fifth
57
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice George Sutherland, writing for the Court, asserted that with respect to wages, women were
the equal of men and should not enjoy the special protection afforded them in this legislation—especially with the Nineteenth Amendment having been ratified only three years earlier. Differences in
physical stature were not relevant here. As he stated:
In this aspect of the matter, while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions
of work may properly take them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances. To do so would
be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend
of legislation, as well as that of common thought and usage, by which
woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be
given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her con58
tractual and civil relationships.

Likewise, similar anti-reform arguments regarding gender appear in
Morehead v. New York, when the Court struck down a New York minimum wage law for women and minors for violating the freedom of
59
contract.
But if it is not surprising to see anti-reform arguments emphasizing sameness between the groups in question and other groups, antireform Justices also deployed arguments emphasizing group difference too. In Lochner, the topic of the relative unhealthiness of the
baking profession came up for considerable discussion in both the
60
majority opinion and in Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion.
Justice Peckham’s opinion for the Court both minimized any particular danger associated with the baking profession—as noted above—
56
57
58
59

60

Id. at 57, 59.
261 U.S. 525, 559–62 (1923).
Id. at 553.
298 U.S. 587, 611 (1936); accord West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411–13 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (making similar arguments that “[d]ifference of sex affords no reasonable
ground for making a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all women from which
like contracts of all working men are left free”).
198 U.S. at 70–71.
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and went on to make the following argument: even if baking may not
be the most healthy of all professions, it was no worse than many other professions that were not presently the focus of New York state
employment regulations. Justice Peckham made this argument in the
context of raising a slippery slope concern of endless legislative regulation of occupations, if all that were needed to justify regulation was
61
some sort of risk to an employee’s health. In other words, Justice
Peckham acknowledged that the baking profession may not be exactly the same as all other professions when it came to health risks. But
even if there may be some differences between it and others, the risks
of being a baker lay well within an acceptable range of varying employment health risks: i.e., baking lay within an “acceptable” set of diverse occupations that did not require special legislative attention.
B. Pro-Reform Arguments on Economic Rights
In contrast to the prior arguments, a different set of arguments
were deployed by those Justices pressing a more pro-reform position.
But even if they were different in their specifics, these pro-reform arguments also emphasized group sameness and difference.
Arguments emphasizing group difference were, not surprisingly,
deployed by pro-reform Justices in these cases. When a Justice sought
to defend legislation setting minimum wages or maximum hours for
a certain class of employees, a common move was to emphasize the
distinctiveness of the occupation—either for its heightened potential
health risk to workers or because workers in that occupation were
hobbled by significantly unequal bargaining power with their employers. One of the most important precedents establishing these
principles was Holden v. Hardy, where the Court upheld a Utah statute
establishing maximum hours for miners and those engaged “in the
62
The Court
smelting, reduction, or refining of ores and metals.”
concluded that the law was within the police powers of the state of
Utah, and did not violate liberty of contract, due process, or equal
63
protection.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon a number of
prior, legitimate incursions on the right of contract in the form of
64
health and safety laws. With respect to the statute at issue in Holden
specifically, Justice Henry Brown stated for the Court that
61
62
63
64

Id. at 59–61.
169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898).
Id.
See id. at 391–93 (describing the Court’s recent decisions in this area).
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[w]e think the act in question may be sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power of the State. The enactment does not profess to limit the
hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground mines or in the smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals.
These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has judged
to be detrimental to the health of the employés, and, so long as there are
reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decision upon this sub65
ject cannot be reviewed by the Federal courts.

Similar arguments regarding group difference were made by Justice
66
Harlan in dissent in Lochner as well, where he cited to Holden.
The Court in Holden further noted that the law at issue there
might be justified by a legislative belief in an inequality of bargaining
power between employers and employees in this specific context:
The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the experience of legislators in many States has corroborated, that the proprietors of these
[mining] establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an
equality, and that their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The
former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their
employés, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to
conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would
pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other words,
the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe
67
guide, and the legislature may properly interpose its authority.

Beyond the context of dangerous occupations, the Court also expressed some openness to allowing exceptions to the impartial state
ideal with regulations governing the hours and wages of female and
minor employees. These arguments followed a different structure
because the point of emphasis was less the particular kind of occupation in question, and more the peculiar obstacles faced by women
and minors in the workplace. Hence Justices sympathetic to wages
and hours regulation for women emphasized the weaker physical
stature of women in treating these regulations as health and safety
measures; they emphasized the absence of equal bargaining power
for female employees as a class; and they deployed civic republican-

65

66
67

Id. at 395; see also id. at 396–97 (continuing to distinguish this group of laborers based on
the hazards of their profession and arguing further that although “reasonable doubts may
exist as to the power of the legislature to pass a law . . . to promote the health, safety or
comfort of the people . . . we must resolve them in favor of the right of that department
of government”).
198 U.S. at 66, 69–71.
Holden, 169 U.S. at 397; see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (“It may be that the statute had its
origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employés in such establishments were not
upon an equal footing . . . .”).
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inspired arguments regarding the unique maternal role of women in
ensuring the vitality of the nation and its populace.
In Muller v. Oregon, a unanimous Court upheld an Oregon maximum hours law for female employees “in any mechanical establish68
ment, or factory, or laundry.” References to the greater relative
physical weakness of women were combined with an appeal to the
maternal obligations placed upon women in this comment by Justice
David Brewer, for the Court:
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon
her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this
from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of
woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to pre69
serve the strength and vigor of the race.

These characteristics thus made women fundamentally different from
men, and justified governmental favoritism through labor regulations: “[d]ifferentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is
properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her
protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not neces70
sary for men and could not be sustained.” As noted above in the
discussion of the Adkins case, Justice Sutherland had emphasized a
basic sameness or similarity across gender with respect to the employment context, especially after the enactment of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920. In response, both Justices William Howard Taft
and Oliver Holmes Jr. dissented in Adkins and converged on a key
point: because the differences in physical stature between men and
women were so basic and consequential, they felt the Nineteenth
Amendment should not be used to reduce labor protections afforded
71
to women.
Likewise, in Morehead, a point of emphasis for Justice Charles
Hughes in his dissent was the particular dangers faced by female and
underage workers in seeking to bargain for their wages with employers:

68
69

70
71

208 U.S. 412, 416, 423 (1908).
Id. at 421; see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398–99 (containing similar arguments emphasizing the relatively greater physical weakness of women and their maternal
function).
Muller, 208 at 422.
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 567 (Taft, J., dissenting); id. at 569 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The Legislature finds that the employment of women and minors in
trade and industry in the State of New York at wages unreasonably low
and not fairly commensurate with the value of the services rendered is a
matter of vital public concern; that many women and minors are not as a
class upon a level of equality in bargaining with their employers in regard
to minimum fair wage standards, and that ‘freedom of contract’ as applied to their relations with employers is illusory; that, by reason of the
necessity of seeking support for themselves and their dependents, they
are forced to accept whatever wages are offered; and that judged by any
reasonable standard, wages in many instances are fixed by chance and
caprice and the wages accepted are often found to bear no relation to
72
the fair value of the service.

No surprise then that given the impartial state ideal, judicial defenses of reforms seeking to carve out exceptions to that ideal would
emphasize the distinctiveness of the groups that might enjoy special
legal protections. But even if a theme of group difference runs most
prominently in these pro-reform arguments, an appeal to sameness
can be found in these arguments as well, and it is implicit in the judicial discussions of unequal bargaining power. If the pro-reform Justices were claiming that certain occupations, or certain kinds of
workers, faced substantial obstacles in attaining “equal” bargaining
power with their employers toward earning “fair” wages or working
“fair” hours, there was also an implicit assumption that something
like equal bargaining power and fair hours/wages did in fact exist as
the aspired normative goal. That is, arguments regarding unequal
bargaining power were implicitly positing a goal of sameness: that
workers in dangerous professions and female or underage employees
needed the benefit of legislation to attain the same benefits for their
labor that their adult, male counterparts in non-dangerous occupations enjoyed. In short, a basic sameness in employee goals provided
a significant portion of the normative appeal of these laws singling
out certain groups for legal protections.
Hence, pro-reform Justices employed arguments in these cases
that referenced a “fair” or “living” wage. This idea is referenced
above at the end of the extended quotation by Justice Hughes in his
Morehead dissent. He followed up that quotation with this additional
comment on the absence of fair wages for women:
Inquiries by the New York State Department of Labor in cooperation
with the Emergency Relief Bureau of New York City disclosed the large
number of women employed in industry whose wages were insufficient for
the support of themselves and those dependent upon them. For that
72

Morehead, 298 U.S. at 626–27 (Hughes, J., dissenting); see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at
398–99 (contending that female workers need additional legal protections because of
their limited bargaining power).
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reason, they had been accepted for relief and their wages were being
73
supplemented by payments from the Emergency Relief Bureau.

Note this comment by Justice Hughes again in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, where his opinion for the Court upheld a Washington state law
setting minimum wages for women (and also overruled Adkins):
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
74
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met.

C. Groups and the Impartial State
Notwithstanding the variety of arguments used on both sides of
the debate on wages and hours legislation, let me conclude this Part
by discussing one basic similarity that runs through both the pro- and
anti-reform arguments: neither side proved hospitable to viewing
group interests as separate from broader, more systematic interests.
This perspective is most obvious in the context of group sameness arguments which, from anti-reform Justices, essentially denied that certain groups had distinct, legitimate interests that should be legallyrecognized and promoted. But this perspective, more notably, also
arose within pro-reform arguments, particularly those arguments
emphasizing group difference. Even in group difference arguments
favoring reform, group interests were closely linked to broader concerns or goals that were systemic, and that transcended the interests
of the group in question.
One example of this includes pro-reform arguments linking the
protection of certain groups to more universalistic goals such as the
broader public’s health and safety; indeed, sometimes pro-reform judicial arguments treated the health and safety of certain employees as
essentially equivalent to the health and safety of the broader public.75
Another example is pro-reform judicial arguments linking wages and
hours legislation for specific groups to the economy and broader
goals such as promoting fair economic competition and industrial
stability. Indeed the goals of competition and industrial stability were
mentioned approvingly by the Court in United States v. Darby, where
the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)—which set

73
74
75

Morehead, 298 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
See Holden, 169 U.S. at 395; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 393–94.
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maximum hours and a minimum wage for employees in the produc76
tion of goods for interstate commerce.
In one sense, this is hardly surprising. The judicial emphasis on a
broader public interest in these discussions speaks in part to the
broader theory of the impartial state. As noted above, the Court had
consistently allowed for exceptions to that ideal in its rulings; it allowed for laws—usually categorized as “health and safety” laws 77—to
specifically benefit or burden particular groups if such laws could be
justified as serving the public interest and falling within general police powers. Thus referencing benefits that might flow to other
groups or society at large with class-specific legislation was a principle
explicitly built into the doctrine itself.
Still, the judicial focus on explicating how certain group interests
served broader goals also appears to encompass an ideal that goes beyond this doctrinal principle. Consider a second example: the references to the state’s interest in the maternal function of women, in
support of labor protections for female employees. 78 This argument
certainly implicated health and safety considerations too. 79 But it also
invoked civic republican notions of the common good, and spoke to,
or implied, broader notions of societal equity in relation to the welfare of female workers. That is, some of these arguments emphasized
the burden imposed upon the broader taxpaying public when female
workers were not paid a living wage. 80 The state’s interest in protecting female workers was thus motivated by more than just the benefits
that would accrue to those particular workers. Justice Hughes stated
the following in his opinion for the Court in West Coast Hotel in upholding the minimum wage law for women at issue there: “The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.” 81
Finally, judicial efforts to link group-interests to broader communal and systemic goals appear in a third way: a strategic instrumentalism intersects with the appeals to group interests in these cases. In
examining the arc of wages and hours legislation in the early twentieth century, we can plausibly link the focus on particular groups in
76

77
78
79
80
81

312 U.S. 100, 109 n.1, 109–10, 122 (1941); see also Morehead, 298 U.S. at 626–27 (Hughes,
J., dissenting) (discussing the larger social problem and burden placed on taxpayers arising out of female workers’ lower wages and weakened bargaining power).
See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58; see also GILLMAN, supra note 51, at 127–30.
See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421–22; Morehead, 298 U.S. at 629–30 (Hughes, J., dissenting); id. at
633 (Stone, J., dissenting); West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398.
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95, 398.
See Morehead, 298 U.S. at 635 (Stone, J., dissenting).
300 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).

Oct. 2015]

SITUATING GROUPS

123

these cases to a broader trend toward more universal hours and wages legislation that culminated in the FLSA. For example, the National Consumers’ League, one of the crucial advocacy groups in the development of labor standards legislation in the early twentieth
century, purposefully focused on women-specific reforms as an “entering wedge” strategy toward later securing wages and hours legislation for workers in general. 82 Likewise, the decision to remain focused on female workers in future-Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous
brief in Muller v. Oregon—a case he was shepherded to by the National
Consumers’ League—was also a choice calculated toward securing
judicial success and certainly not a reflection of Justice Brandeis’s belief that labor protections should stop with female workers. 83 Not
surprisingly, by the time the Court confronted the FLSA in Darby, it
explicitly referenced one of that statute’s concerns with establishing a
“minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general wellbeing of workers” in general. 84 The focus on particular
groups in these earlier cases might be seen as driven then, at least in
part, by pragmatic political and judicial judgment toward securing a
more universal reform, and less by the inherent distinctiveness of the
groups themselves.
I would tentatively assert here that judicial tendencies to think of
group interests as tied to broader, more systemic or universalistic
goals is a distinctive feature of these arguments in the wages and
hours cases, during these years. In contrast, as I will discuss in the
remainder of this Article, group-focused arguments from the late
twentieth to the early twenty-first century on gender and gay equality
have been characterized by some key, distinct rhetorical elements. I
turn now to examine some more recent constitutional cases.
III. THE PARTIAL STATE
If the notion of an impartial state held sway in the Lochner era with
respect to wages and hours legislation, much of the Court’s post82

83

84

LANDON R.Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE,
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 2–4, 6, 42, 46, 58
(2000). The National Consumers’ League was also involved in the effort to pass the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Id. at 177, 183, 185.
Id. at 44–45; PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 60 (1993); PHILIPPA
STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 128 (1984). Strum notes that “[b]y
far the largest share of the work on the brief was done by [Josephine] Goldmark,” who
was Justice Brandeis’s sister-in-law and who also worked as the research director of the
National Consumers’ League. STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra, at 60;
STORRS, supra note 82, at 44.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 109.
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Brown v. Board of Education jurisprudence on noneconomic rights
might be characterized as subscribing to the notion of a partial state.
That is, during this period the Court expressed greater explicit
openness to the idea of the state, and the judiciary especially, engaging in targeted actions to benefit specific social groups.
As noted above, the partial state ideal was indeed suggested in
Footnote Four of Carolene Products; Justice Stone’s majority opinion
contained a strong statement of judicial deference to elected bodies
on economic rights, while also demarcating certain areas where the
Court might remain assertive and scrutinize legislative actions to a
greater degree. Among these areas were those noted in Footnote
Four’s third paragraph: laws that targeted “religious,” “national,” or
“racial” minorities, or laws that encompassed “prejudice against dis85
crete and insular minorities.” The Footnote’s third paragraph thus
spoke to the notion of the Court engaging in class politics benefitting
a minority social group, and due in no small part to this, John Hart
Ely focused on Footnote Four as a justification for much of the War86
ren Court’s subsequent rights jurisprudence.
Let me then briefly articulate key elements of the partial state perspective that emerge in some of the Court’s opinions during the postBrown era. First, if the dominant judicial fear of the Lochner-era Court
was a legislative process descending into pork barrel legislation and
rampant favoritism to certain classes, the dominant fear within the
partial state perspective is a legislature inclined to ignore or harm the
interests and rights of certain groups. When the interests of these
unfortunate groups are ignored or harmed, key problems emerge:
members of these groups are denied “equal concern and respect”
and the functioning of democratic processes is fundamentally im87
paired. Second, in response to these problems, the partial state ideal would have the state—and the Court especially—engage in class
politics to correct for these flaws. This is more or less the opposite of
the prescriptions of the impartial state.
In the cases that follow, I draw attention to one similarity and one
point of divergence between the post-Brown cases on gender and gay
equality and the Lochner-era cases on economic rights. The similarity
85
86

87

Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
ELY, supra note 5, at 75–77. To be sure, to say that the Court has “favored” certain minority groups carries some crucial presumptions, and is complicated by the question of what
the proper analytical baseline is for determining “favoritism.” I will explore this point in
greater detail below.
Id. at 74–77, 82, 84–85,103–04. In discussing the notion of equal concern and respect, Ely
relied on the work of Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 180 (1977).
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is this: in the gender and gay equality cases, we again see that both
the pro- and anti-reform arguments put forth by Justices appeal to
themes of group sameness and group difference.
At the same time, there is a crucial difference between these cases
and the Lochner-era cases: if pro-reform arguments in the Lochner era
appealed to group interests in a broader, more systemic or more instrumental manner, such concerns seem to be more subdued in the
post-Brown cases. Larger, more systemic goals encompassing other
social groups or the broader polity do not seem to color the Court’s
discussion of group rights to the same degree here. Rather, the
Court appears more engaged in class politics, largely to the benefit of
only the group in question. Thus, the partial state perspective aligns
well with notions of societal segmentation, a concept that I will begin to
flesh out in this Part.
A final note on case selection: in the discussion below, my focus is
only on the Court’s gender and sexual orientation cases where the
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions devoted some explicit
attention to group interests. I focus on these two bodies of doctrine
because they constitute two of the most visible and important examples of judicial assertiveness against conflicting prior doctrine, and
conflicting federal and state statutes. I have, however, bypassed a discussion of Brown itself and the post-Brown cases on race and equal
protection. This is partly because the gender and sexual orientation
cases arguably present better case studies of judicial assertiveness;
while the Court’s post-civil rights era jurisprudence on race was built
upon a foundation of earlier judicial precedents and pivotal congressional statutes, there had been no such legislative basis for the doctrinal shifts in gender and gay equality. As a result, the judicial articulation of rights in the latter contexts was relatively more dependent
upon the judiciary’s own reasoning.
A. Pro-Reform Arguments on Gender and Gay Equality
Within pro-reform arguments in the context of gender and gay
rights, appeals to similarity and difference are tightly intertwined and
often deployed in the same sentences. With respect to sameness, proreform arguments tend to begin with the assumption of a normative
baseline that is assumed to be universal and equal for all relevant social groups. But from this assumption of equality, pro-reform legal
conclusions follow in those cases where certain social groups—which
should be treated on an equal footing with their legitimate analogues
(“like cases”)—are found to be facing severe legal and social inequalities under status quo conditions. That is, it is the status quo condi-
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tion of “difference” for certain unfortunate social groups that justifies
a corresponding judicial action to treat these groups differently—and
more favorably—to counteract an unfair set of baseline conditions
and return them to “equality.” The justification for differential and
beneficial treatment for certain groups, by the Court, stems from a
perceived, initial departure from equality.
The basic shape of this argument is familiar enough for anyone
who has read these cases or the Court’s cases on race-based affirmative action, and it mirrors President Lyndon Johnson’s notable comments analogizing the problems of racial inequality to the rules of a
foot race:
But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries
by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire,
and choose the leaders you please. You do not take a person who, for
years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the
88
others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.

Still, while this same argument reappears in the context of gender
and gay equality, it does carry some additional subtleties in the latter
two contexts. With respect to gender, pro-reform arguments were influenced by the Court’s earlier rulings in race and equal protection,
and emphasized a long history of discrimination against women to
justify the application of heightened scrutiny to gender classifications.
For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court overturned a system of military benefits for dependents that imposed
89
greater burdens on female military members. The Court justified
the application of heightened scrutiny by discussing the presence of
gender discrimination, paternalism, and archaic stereotypes against
women in law and society, leading to the imposition of legal disabilities upon women at different historical periods, including the inabil90
ity to hold office, serve on juries, or vote.
Similarly, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court
ruled that a Mississippi public university that maintained an allfemale nursing program (and that denied admission to a male appli88

89
90

Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Commencement Address at Howard
University: To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp.
411 U.S. 677, 684–87, 688 (1973).
Id.; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–27 (1982) (noting that
“[c]are must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypic” notions of gender); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135–36 (arguing that “this Court
consistently has subjected gender-based classifications to heightened scrutiny in recognition of the real danger that government policies that professedly are based on reasonable
considerations” may reflect archaic generalizations about gender).
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cant on those grounds) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
91
In doing so, the Court majority found
Fourteenth Amendment.
that the university perpetuated the archaic stereotype of nursing as a
92
And in United States v. Virginia, the
profession only for women.
Court ruled that the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”), a public military university, violated the Equal Protection Clause by excluding
93
women from admission. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion for
the Court emphasized an extended history of discrimination against
94
women, and she noted that while gender differences may exist and
could be celebrated, they could not be deployed to subordinate or
95
otherwise harm the interests of women.
Recall the comments of Justices Taft and Holmes’ dissent in Adkins, when they stated their skepticism about the Nineteenth
Amendment eliminating the need for protective legislation for female employees. In a similar vein, Justice William Brennan voiced
skepticism in his opinion for the Court in Frontiero that advances for
women over the latter half of the twentieth century were sufficient to
eliminate the need for judicial action protective of women. In commenting on the unique pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, Justice
Brennan stated that:
It is true, of course, that the position of women in America has improved
markedly in recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that,
in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still
face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously,
96
in the political arena.

The race-gender analogy was often made explicit in these cases,
since both kinds of social identities arguably had a similar nature:
they were individual characteristics imposed arbitrarily at birth, and
they had the effect of diminishing the opportunities and benefits of
those individuals assigned a more “inferior” status by society. As Justice Brennan stated in Frontiero:
And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of

91
92
93
94
95
96

Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729–30.
Id.
518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996).
Id. at 531–32.
Id. at 533–34.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–86 (footnotes omitted).
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females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
97
its individual members.

Judicial arguments defending the special, favored treatment of
groups because of the distinctive disabilities faced by those groups is a
familiar point. But embedded within these comments on the peculiar disabilities faced by women are also implicit assumptions of sameness—namely, the assumption of a universal, fair baseline from which
the Court might make judgments about the welfare and treatment of
individuals. Indeed, the Court’s belief that women had been treated
by the law and civil society in ways that diverged from this baseline—
to the detriment of women as a class—was what justified the differential treatment of women (and the application of heightened scrutiny
98
for gender classifications) by the judiciary. Hence the Court’s discussion of pernicious stereotypes against women is intertwined with
concerns about how such stereotypes pervert judgments that should
be based upon merit or performance—a fairer baseline, as the Court
often implied. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited gender-based jury selection, and disal99
lowed the state’s use of gender-based peremptory challenges. In
Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in this case, he stated:
Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular
views simply because of their gender is ‘practically a brand upon them,
affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority.’ Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror,
and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation. The message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those
who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals,
for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could
100
disagree.

Similar kinds of arguments appear in the pro-reform judicial opinions on gay rights. In the three opinions discussed below, all authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, there is a baseline presumption
of sameness between gay persons and other social groups—to be free
97

98
99
100

Id. at 686–87 (footnotes omitted); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135–36. For an extremely
detailed historical analysis of the race-gender analogy, as deployed by feminist legal advocates, see generally SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011).
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
511 U.S. at 138–42.
Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted); accord. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 543–45 (arguing that the justifications for excluding all women from citizen-soldier training are not “exceedingly persuasive”).
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of animus, prejudice, and certain legal disabilities—and judicial action is subsequently necessary when laws exist that treat gay persons
in a different, less favorable way. That is, targeted judicial action in
defense of gay rights is justified by the prior presence of targeted discrimination against gay persons in past precedents or legislation.
Thus in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down Amendment 2 to Colorado’s state constitution. 101 Amendment 2 prohibited antidiscrimination laws at the state and local level for persons based on their
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.” 102 One of the crucial components of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court was his emphasis on the targeted discriminatory nature of Amendment 2. He emphasized that only gay persons
were targeted with the particular legal disability contained within it:
Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to
transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.
The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
103
reinstatement of these laws and policies.

Furthermore, Justice Kennedy asserted that animus against the entire
class of gay persons was the real motivation behind Amendment 2. 104
Likewise, in Lawrence v. Texas the Court struck down Texas’s antisodomy statute, targeted only at gay persons, as a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 105 Justice Kennedy,
again writing for the Court, argued that the anti-sodomy statute took
something away from gay persons that all others were able to enjoy,
and that went beyond the mere act of sex:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport
to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and

101
102
103

104

105

517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 627; see also id. at 627–31 (describing other ways in which Amendment 2 restricted
homosexuals). Notably, Justice Kennedy also invoked the precedent of the Civil Rights
Cases:
[Amendment 2] is a status based enactment divorced from any factual context from
which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification
of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does
not permit. ‘[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .’ Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., at 24.
Id. at 635; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (making similar comments about the Texas anti-sodomy statute at issue).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(commenting on the insufficiency of “moral disapproval” of gay persons as a legitimate
state purpose under the Equal Protection Clause in the context of the anti-sodomy statute
at issue).
539 U.S. at 567.
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purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon
the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as crimi106
nals.

Furthermore, the criminalization of this conduct by the state carried with it certain stigma harms that would attach only to gay persons, and that would remain even if the Court were to use the Equal
Protection Clause to strike the law down, rather than the Due Process
Clause:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central
holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it
should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
107
homosexual persons.

Finally, all of the preceding themes of animus, stigma harms, and
the imposition of a significant and targeted legal disability reappear
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Windsor. 108 There, the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act’s
(“DOMA”) definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man
and one woman” for federal purposes as a violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process. 109 In doing so, Justice Kennedy viewed this definition in DOMA as singling out gay persons for a legal disability with
real consequences—both financial and in the form of a stigma
harm. 110 Furthermore, he viewed DOMA as being motivated by a goal
of animus against gay persons, which justified the Court’s subsequent
actions in defense of their rights:
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,

106

107
108
109
110

Id.; accord. id. at 574 (noting that “our laws and traditions afford constitutional protection” to intimate and private decisions that are “central to personal dignity and autonomy”).
Id. at 575; see also id. at 575–76, 578 (describing in further detail the “collateral consequences” of the anti-sodomy statute).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2695.
Id. at 2692–95.
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sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this
protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amend111
ment.

B. Anti-Reform Arguments on Gender and Gay Equality
If Justice Kennedy’s opinions dominate the discussion of gay
rights on the pro-reform side, Justice Antonin Scalia’s arguments
dominate the discussion on the anti-reform side. Very similar to the
anti-reform arguments put forth during the Lochner era, one argument repeated by Justice Scalia was to deemphasize differences between women or gay persons, relative to those groups not receiving
special judicial protection. Thus in his dissent in United States v. Virginia, Justice Scalia questioned whether it made sense to treat women
as a disempowered minority at all. They were not a numerical minority—making them not analogous to racial minorities—and federal
legislative victories for women’s rights suggested that they were not
lacking in political influence either. Justice Scalia further noted that
the apparent assumption of pro-reform Justices that women as a
group lacked the ability to properly exert their potential political
power suggested a kind of paternalism in its own right that was similar to what the pro-reform Court majority found troubling in VMI’s
112
actions.
Similarly, in the context of gay rights, Justice Scalia was unsympathetic to the notion of gay persons constituting a weaker political
class. To the contrary, in his Romer dissent he emphasized that gay
rights advocates had demonstrated their ability to successfully navigate the political process with victories at the local and state level pri113
More pointedly, in both his Romer and Lawor to Amendment 2.
rence dissents, he suggested that gay rights advocates were actually
placed in a more favored position relative to other social groups because of the close alignment in ideology between them and members
of the legal elite. As he stated in his Lawrence dissent:
Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a lawprofession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct. . . . [M]any Americans do not want
persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their

111
112
113

Id. at 2696; see also id. at 2693–95.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

132

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:1

business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it as ‘discrimination’ which it is
the function of our judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the
law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘main114
stream’ . . . .

Stated more precisely, in the Romer case, Justice Scalia viewed the initial anti-discrimination legislative protecting gay persons at the state
and local level as a legitimate kind of class politics favoring that
group. In response, the passage of Amendment 2 was, in his estimation, also a legitimate, political response to remove that prior, favorable legislation, and to place gay persons back on the same equal footing as everyone else. As he stated of Amendment 2, “[t]he people of
Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does
not even disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely
115
denies them preferential treatment.”
By contesting the presumption of constitutionally significant inequalities for women or gay persons in the status quo, Justice Scalia
thus viewed the Court’s subsequent actions in defense of their rights
not as corrective or as remedial, but as a kind of pure favoritism—i.e.,
the kind of class legislation that inspired the ideal of an impartial
state as a corrective. In his Romer dissent, he stated:
Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal democratic means, including the
democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions. This Court has
no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the
elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, pro116
nouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.
117

Similar arguments appear in his Lawrence dissent as well.
Alongside these appeals to the inherent sameness between women, gay persons, and other less judicially favored social groups, Justice
Scalia does make an argument regarding group difference as well. It
is clear that in each of these controversies, there is no purely neutral

114
115

116

117

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 637, 638–39 (arguing further
that the only “equal treatment” denied to homosexuals as a result of Amendment 2 was
the ability to obtain “preferential treatment”). This was also the state of Colorado’s position on Amendment 2, which the Court majority rejected. Id. at 626 (majority opinion).
517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 646, 652–53 (stating a concern with a particular class of individuals becoming the impetus for such a shift
from traditional values).
539 U.S. at 602–03 (Scalia., J., dissenting).
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outcome. Under the status quo prior to judicial intervention, women—but not men—are denied admission into VMI, and gay persons—but not straight persons—are placed at a legal disadvantage in
being subject to Colorado’s Amendment 2, Texas’s anti-sodomy statute, and the definition of marriage within DOMA. With the Court’s
actions, women and gay persons are freed of these legal disabilities.
Justice Scalia recognizes, of course, that women and gay persons
would be subject to a different, and smaller set of legal entitlements—relative to other social groups—if the Court were to forego
action in these cases. But he critiqued the Court’s actions, and stated
his preference for a default to the status quo and its differential
treatment for women and gay persons, with the claim that status quo
conditions were well within the bounds of acceptable, pluralistic,
democratic politics.
That is, the prospect of different social groups enjoying different
legal entitlements was acceptable so long as this did not run afoul of
constitutional guarantees. In a sense then, Justice Scalia made it
clear that he was fine with class politics, and he was fine with some
differential treatment of different groups under the law, so long as it
was legitimate class politics done by legislatures. Judicially led class
politics, however, was a different matter, and that was how he would
describe the Court’s intervention in these cases. As he stated in his
Lawrence dissent:
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every
group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such
matters is the best. That homosexuals have achieved some success in that
enterprise is attested to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining
States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts. But persuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one’s views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would no
more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts—or, for that matter,
display any moral disapprobation of them—than I would forbid it to do
so. What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional
democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new ‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of
118
democratic change.

That is, gay rights advocates should not be allowed to have the Court
bail them out when they lose in the democratic arena.

118

539 U.S. at 603 (Scalia., J., dissenting); see also id. at 602–05 (arguing further that the
democratic process, not the Courts, should resolve these matters). For a similar comment in his Romer dissent, see 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. SEGMENTATION ARGUMENTS AND THE POST-BROWN-ERA CASES ON
GENDER AND GAY EQUALITY
As noted before, one basic similarity runs across the Lochner-era
cases and the more recent cases on gender and sexual orientation:
pro-reform and anti-reform judges in both eras employed arguments
about group sameness and group difference when discussing group
interests. Yet notwithstanding this similarity, arguments in defense of
group interests in the context of gender and gay equality diverge in
one key regard from such arguments in the Lochner-era cases.
By way of beginning to flesh out this claim, let us first consider the
most obvious difference between these two sets of cases: the nature of
the groups involved in each era. In the Lochner era, there was an emphasis on specific types of employees (and by implication specific
types of employers): for example, miners, bakers, and those who
employed them. Hence the judicial focus in these cases was on the
nature of certain kinds of economic relationships, and this was true
even when the subjects of litigation were female or underage workers.
Professional identity, gender identity, or age identity were relevant in
these cases only to the extent that it held implications for both evaluating the nature of an employment relationship, and helping judges
determine whether wages or hours legislation was appropriate for
certain workers or not.
In contrast, no such consistent focus exists within the more recent
gender and gay equality cases—at least with respect to the immediate
focus of litigation in these cases. Again, these cases dealt with diverse
topics such as admission to a public university, an anti-sodomy statute,
and gay marriage. What joins them and makes them appropriate for
comparison are the subjects of litigation in these cases, and the
shared identities of these subjects. That is, these cases are commonly
grouped together and treated as gender equality or gay equality cases
precisely because they implicate issues dealing with two groups that
are commonly defined by social status—i.e., these cases concern so119
cial groups.
Carolene Products’ Footnote Four discussed groups that are “discrete and insular,” which has had great effect in how scholars have
120
theorized about the judiciary’s relationship with social groups. But
119

120

On the topic of group status in American constitutional law, see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321–42 (1997). On the theory of social groups, see IRIS
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 42–48 (1990).
See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 122–23 and accompanying
text. For a critique of judicial and scholarly focus on group discreteness and insularity,
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perhaps a more precise—and, I believe, relatively non-controversial—
description of these social groups that have earned special judicial solicitude since the New Deal era would include the following elements.
First, the group possesses a significant degree of “permanence” such
that one’s membership in the group is, or the social characteristics
that help define the group are, relatively non-fluid as a matter of social relations. Footnote Four’s reference to “discrete” groups offers a
narrower formulation of this idea. Second, the social characteristics
that help define the group and its members are largely perceived by
the broader society to be central to a group member’s identity. That
is, these social characteristics are not easily shed for most individuals,
in the same way that one’s age or professional identity might change.
Finally, especially when the judiciary takes the initiative to defend
these groups, such actions are usually supported by a prevailing
sense—at least among the judiciary and often among a majority of
the electorate as well—of an unfair social disadvantage accompanying
121
group membership.
Beyond this rather obvious point that the kinds of groups implicated in the later cases were distinct from the kinds of groups implicated in the Lochner-era cases, the contemporary Court’s focus on social groups points to a second and more important difference
between these two eras. Recall that in the context of the Lochner-era

121

see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–31, 745–46
(1985).
This description draws on prior discussions of this topic in the following works: YOUNG,
supra note 119, at 42–48; Balkin, supra note 120, at 2359–60; Robert M. Cover, The Origins
of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1294–95 (1982); Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107, 148–50 (1976);
Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607, 610 (1975)
(reviewing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). Groups defined by social status
are distinct from alternative conceptions of groups modeled on notions of “association”
or “aggregates”—the latter two being more prevalent in pluralist theories of political science. As Young notes, aggregates are defined as collections of individuals sharing certain
attributes, and associations are groups constituted by individuals sharing practices and
norms. YOUNG, supra note 119, at 43–44. In contrast to the possibly impersonal, abstract
nature of aggregate groups, social groups are instead constituted by the nature of how
group members are situated and positioned in relation to one another and in relation to
non-group members. Similarly, this characteristic of social groups also speaks to how they
are distinct from associations. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 89–90
(2000). In earlier work, Young went further in differentiating social groups from aggregates and associations. She argued that while social groups may not “exist” apart from
their individual members, they are not mere collections of fully formed individuals either.
Unlike aggregates and associations, she claimed that social groups partially constitute the
social identities of their members. YOUNG, supra note 119, at 42–44. For her subsequent
comments on the relationship between identity and social groups, see YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY, supra at 99–102.
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cases, pro-reform arguments emphasizing the distinctiveness of protected groups—relative to all other economic groups that would not
be protected by legislation—often had some link to broader, more
systemic reform goals. For example, pro-reform arguments for specific groups linked the protective legislation at issue to the public interest (which was an explicit doctrinal principle within the case law),
the broader economy, or the vitality of the nation and the American
populace through the maternal role of female workers. Furthermore, when examined in whole, the broader legislative effort—and
subsequent judicial acquiescence—toward wages and hours regulations for workers in general suggested that the earlier, more targeted
reforms seeking protection of certain economic groups might plausibly be seen as instrumental to the larger, more universal goal.
In contrast, such broader goals are less apparent with the more
recent judicial emphasis on group difference in the gender and gay
equality cases. The judicial solicitude for these groups appears to extend only to the protected groups, with no larger goals driving the
Court’s actions—and certainly no explicit doctrinal requirement akin
to the Lochner-era demand that class-specific reform legislation serve
the public interest. Indeed, in the Court’s discussion of group rights
and interests in the more recent cases, its focus is on the very specific
and targeted legal disabilities these groups have suffered. Documenting these disabilities was a crucial early step in the Court’s analysis in
these cases, and it generally provided the basis for very specific and
targeted judicial remedies. As we have seen, group-specific past
harms and group-specific legal remedies were crucial elements of the
arguments in pro-reform gender and gay equality opinions.
One might say that perhaps the Court’s actions in these cases are
plausibly tied to broader goals like perfecting democratic procedures
122
or ensuring some universal, equal level of status and respect for all.
But even if such concerns have motivated these cases, they are seemingly more subdued here compared to the broader, systemic concerns at work in the wages and hours cases from the Lochner era. In
122

Ely focused on these themes in discussing the jurisprudence of the Warren Court and in
elaborating on his normative theory of judicial review. ELY, supra note 5, at 74–77, 82, 84–
85, 103–04. I should note, perhaps one exception to my argument among the cases I discuss is J.E.B. v. Alabama, where the Court’s pro-reform ruling was linked to broader communal interests. See 511 U.S. at 140, 142 (noting that “[d]iscrimination in jury selection,
whether based on race or gender,” harms not only those who are excluded but also the
community at large). However, communal interests were likely relevant there less because of the gender equality issue, and more because of that ruling’s focus on the peremptory challenge, and accompanying questions concerning the integrity of the legal system.
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the more recent cases, the rights and interests of certain groups merit
judicial solicitude simply because those groups (or the individual
members of those groups) were determined by the Court to merit its
solicitude.
To be sure, and as noted above, the judicial protection of group
interests can be seen as either a defense of group rights (at least partly) for its own sake, or merely as a means toward protecting the rights
of individual group members. But regardless of whether the Court
may ultimately be more concerned with groups or with individual
group members, what nevertheless emerges from the contemporary
cases is a judicial outlook more accepting of societal segmentation.
Given the Court’s focus on groups defined by more permanent, central, and disadvantaging social characteristics, and given the absence
of more visible universal goals driving legal reform, the key units of
analysis for the Court in these cases are fixed, relatively unchanging
groups. Thus, while majorities of the Court have remained committed to liberal notions of individualism and equality across individuals
in these cases on gender and gay equality, they have also pressed
forth a group-centered perspective—and an openness to differentiation across groups—in a way not shown by Court majorities in the
Lochner-era cases.
This greater emphasis on groups and group differentiation carries
two sets of implications for themes in American political thought.
The first is that the post-Brown cases hint at a distinct mode of political or legal argument reflecting a theme of societal segmentation. To
be clear, I make no claim that this mode of argument is unique to the
race, gender, or gay equality cases, nor that it is distinct to post-New
Deal-era jurisprudence. To the contrary, I believe segmentation
themes appear episodically throughout American history, in a variety
of different institutional and policy contexts. The Court rulings on
gender and gay equality discussed here are merely one recent exam123
ple of this form of argument.
123

Though I will have to defer a more extended discussion of the race cases and segmentation to future work, a few observations are worth mentioning at this point. First, notions
of segmentation are, without question, prominent within some of the Court’s opinions
that promoted and aided the interests of racial minorities. Consider this comment by
Justice William Strong for the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, where the Court struck
down a state law excluding African Americans from jury service:
At the time when they [the Reconstruction Amendments] were incorporated into the
Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those
who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike,
and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that

138

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:1

Segmentation arguments, as I define them, invoke a description
124
of society that might be gleaned in legal and political arguments.

124

had before existed. Discriminations against them had been habitual. It was well
known that in some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others
might well be expected. The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in
that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the
protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect
themselves. They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States
where they were resident. It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth
Amendment was framed and adopted.
100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880); see also id. at 306–09 (describing further the backdrop against
which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).
Present within this comment, alongside racist-paternalist sentiments, are the familiar
themes of judicial solicitude for a particular social group based upon the targeted harms
suffered by that group. A more recent example may be found in Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun’s separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
where in voting to uphold the U.C. Davis affirmative action program, they stated that
“[t]he lingering effects of past discrimination continue to make race-conscious remedial
programs appropriate means for ensuring equal educational opportunity in universities.”
438 U.S. 265, 373 (1978); see also id. at 359, 362, 373–74 (arguing further that the purpose
of the program, to “overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the races together,”
was justifiable).
Second, however, the race cases may diverge from the gender and gay equality cases
in that broader, systemic interests have been articulated by the Court to justify rulings
that plausibly benefit racial minorities. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education itself,
the Court supported its ruling striking down segregated public schooling by emphasizing
the importance of public education both for African-American children and for the
broader society as well. 347 U.S. at 493–94. On the latter point, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that “[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.” Id. at
493. Consider also the Court’s more recent rulings in defense of race-based affirmative
action, where such policies are defended in the name of diversity interests that serve a
broad array of interests: the interests of minority student beneficiaries of these programs,
the interests of non-minority classmates whose learning is enhanced by this diversity, and
society-wide interests in cultivating active and knowledgeable citizenship and leadership
among all racial groups. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–16, 330–32
(2003); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–15.
Thus, in the Court’s rulings benefitting racial minorities, we find themes and arguments that both overlap and seemingly diverge from the segmentation themes that appear in the context of the gender and gay equality cases. My tentative belief is that these
points of divergence in the race cases reflect the peculiar political, institutional, and intellectual context in which the rise of strict scrutiny, and the judicial antipathy to racial classifications, first solidified in the doctrine in the middle to the latter part of the twentieth
century. Further, the Court’s conceptualization of racial minority groups in its more recent cases reflects a mix of the ideas and arguments from both this earlier, formative period, and from its more recent cases in the post-Civil Rights era.
The precise relationship between segmentation arguments—as I define them—and the
wide array of other arguments in American politics stressing “pluralism” is a large topic
that I will have to leave for future work. However, for a short, excellent intellectual histo-
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We might say that a legal or political actor makes an argument referencing segmentation in the following circumstances. First, the person proceeds from the assumption, or seeks to assert, that certain
cleavages exist in American society that are persistent and significant
within the polity. We might expect the referenced cleavages to be
tied to distinct and separate social identities. Further, these arguments may assert the permanence of these cleavages. Or, they may
assert a belief in the possibility of key cleavages eventually being
erased—though the latter argument would likely be joined with an
accompanying demand for a change of posture by the state and/or a
hope that the passage of time would have significant effect in erasing
125
differences. Second, implied within the preceding point, but worth
spelling out explicitly, segmentation arguments invoke or perceive
situations where the benefits or burdens tied to a particular issue or
policy are relatively more targeted and specific to groups. That is,
these arguments emphasize at least a minimal overlapping of benefits
or burdens across groups, and may contemplate direct conflicts of
group interests. To be sure, arguments reflecting segmentation may
also accompany appeals to the public interest, though the more that
broader, public interest themes recede, the more we may consider
the argument an appeal to segmentation.
Third, building upon the preceding point, segmentation arguments need not be uniformly so. The appeal to segmentation may, in
a given instance, be relatively more or less pronounced; it may travel
alone or it may be mixed with other kinds of arguments. Fourth, and
finally, themes of segmentation may be specific to certain issues or
policy contexts, such that at a given moment in time, segmentation
themes in one policy area may coexist with arguments and appeals to
consensual pluralism or quasi-consensus in other policy areas. That
said, stronger forms of segmentation arguments would emphasize
how certain societal cleavages encompass or implicate or simply overshadow multiple policy areas, with perhaps some pre-Civil War sectional arguments serving as prominent, more dramatic examples of
126
segmentation arguments.

125

126

ry of notions of pluralism tied to race and ethnicity, see JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO
ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA 198–232 (rev. ed. 1984).
See, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s measured endorsement of race-based
affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger, where she concluded her opinion for the Court
by stating that “[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.” 539 U.S. at 343.
See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
A NORTON ANTHOLOGY 607, 617–18 (Isaac Kramnick & Theodore J. Lowi eds., 2009).
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Beyond tentatively illuminating a distinctive mode of argument,
these cases carry a second implication for American political thought:
they point to the increasing acceptance of groups and group-based
analyses within legal and political argument. Consider first the critique that conservatives have sometimes made in accusing the Court’s
127
liberal majority of referring back to Plessy v. Ferguson and other ascriptive hierarchical precedents when the latter defends race-based
128
129
While the critique is problematic, such arguaffirmative action.
ments are correct, of course, that pro-affirmative action arguments
are invoking a form of group-based analysis rooted in social status.
The fact that non-liberal (or even arguably illiberal), group-based
concepts have such currency within the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence on race, gender, and sexual orientation is not indicative of
the contemporary Court departing from liberalism, or situating itself
wholly outside the liberal tradition. Rather, the tentative conclusion I
draw from the gender and gay equality cases is that group-based concepts constitute an interesting synthesis of liberal and non-liberal
concepts. This conceptual synthesis is constituted by a reaffirmation
of the liberal commitment to equality across individuals. But this
commitment is applied to individuals and groups. And this individual-and group-focused commitment to equality is accompanied by at
least the implicit judicial acceptance of quasi-permanent societal
segmentation. The fact that there has been political and social acceptance of such judicial actions accordingly indicates a broader ac127
128
129

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428–29 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
Where such arguments fall short is in assuming that references to social group status by
liberal Court members in defense of affirmative action are legally and ethically equivalent
to such references in defense of racial subordination and ascriptive hierarchy. To the
contrary, we see the contemporary Court deploying group identity toward ends that can
plausibly be defended as egalitarian rather than oppressive to racial minorities. On this
point, Justice John Paul Stevens stated that
[t]he Court’s concept of ‘consistency’ assumes that there is no significant difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some
members of the majority. In my opinion that assumption is untenable. There is
no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to
enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No sensible
conception of the Government’s constitutional obligation to ‘govern impartially,’
should ignore this distinction.
Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ceptance within the polity of these conceptual innovations related to
liberal ideology.
To conclude on two speculative points, we might first ask whether
this mixture of non-liberal and liberal concepts, as reflected in the
Court’s contemporary doctrine on gender and gay equality, is a positive thing from the standpoint of liberal goals. On the one hand,
more obviously, the answer to this query might be a very emphatic
endorsement. The cases here, after all, show liberal goals being advanced by illiberal concepts. Judicial recognition of ascriptive differences—and making these differences the basis for legal and political
reform beneficial to disfavored groups—are ultimately furthering
emancipation and the freedom of individuals across social barriers
that may have remained legally invisible in the absence of social
group recognition. Indeed, once a given social characteristic is
viewed by the judiciary as a significant and substantive departure
from a liberal baseline of universal equality, liberalism’s demand for
universalism can obviously be a powerful tool for change and reform.
Yet, on the other hand, there is also a sense in which harnessing
group difference to liberalism’s demand for universal equality may
carry costs as well. Liberalism’s emancipatory power is most prominent and attractive when confronted with a disfavored group seeking
to enjoy the same set of rights and entitlements enjoyed by all nonsubordinated groups—for example, admission to a public school, or
the right to marry. Liberalism’s demand for universal equality might
even plausibly encompass situations like affirmative action, where differential treatment is used toward achieving goals recognized as
broadly desirable and important such as admission to elite universities or programs, or obtaining competitive employment positions.
But if we take the notion of group difference seriously, it must also
imply that different groups may ultimately value different kinds of
goals or purposes at different moments in time. In situations where
emancipation, freedom, and anti-subordination may demand recognition of a varied and different set of aims for different groups, liberalism’s commitment to universal equality may limit the legal recogni130
For example, although racetion of important group differences.
based affirmative action can plausibly be defended in liberal terms,
the continuing concern felt by some concerning the differential
treatment afforded to distinct racial groups directly speaks to the ten-

130

On the costs that liberal principles may impose upon disadvantaged social groups, see
YOUNG, supra note 119, at 112–16, 164–65.
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sion that exists between these programs and the liberal commitment
to equality.
Still, regardless of how we might normatively evaluate this conceptual synthesis, it seems hard to imagine social group differences disappearing anytime soon, no matter how enthusiastic one might re131
main about assimilation as a goal in American society. This leads to
my second speculative point: to the extent that liberalism will remain
the dominant political philosophy in America, it will continue to
maintain, and will likely expand upon, its conceptual accommodation
of social groups. One point of likely conceptual accommodation is
already well-illustrated in the gender and gay equality cases discussed
above. Liberal defenses of the judicial reforms in these cases can
claim that these rulings are first and foremost about removing legal
disabilities arbitrarily imposed on individuals. To the extent that social groups continue to be viewed as reliable proxies for individual
rights, we may see an expansion of judicial and political rhetorical
emphasis on social groups as key, constitutive units of American soci132
ety.
Another possible point of conceptual accommodation between
liberalism and social group-difference can also be gleaned in the assumptions of equality within the gender and gay rights cases. A more
robust recognition of group-difference may ultimately lie in fleshing
out the liberal notion of equality and emphasizing the multi-faceted
demands of equality. Once equality and emancipation are understood in more context-specific, structural, and historically based ways,
it may ultimately lead the judiciary and the polity to greater recognition and acceptance of differential treatment of social groups as an
implication of liberal equality.
A form of liberalism more accommodating of social group differences may be another episode in liberalism’s evolution and a sign of
its near-endless flexibility. Conversely, a liberalism that is more accommodating of social groups could signal the loosening of liberal131
132

See id. at 47, 163–64.
Will Kymlicka has notably emphasized how a state’s provision of group-specific rights may
be justified within liberal theory. As he states, “For meaningful individual choice to be
possible, individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and freedom of expression and association. They also need access to a societal
culture. Group-differentiated measures that secure and promote this access may, therefore, have a legitimate role to play in a liberal theory of justice.” WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 84 (1995); see also
id. at 52, 82–93 (describing the impact of national and cultural identity on selfNATIONALISM,
identification); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 39–42 (2001) (discussing liberal culturalism).
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ism’s grip upon American politics and American political thought.
However we might classify such a development in political theoretical
terms, however, it would be in keeping with trends in the Court’s jurisprudence since the mid-twentieth century, and it would certainly
speak to normative principles worthy of broader judicial and political
acceptance.
CONCLUSION
In situating key constitutional developments within core themes
drawn from American political thought, I have illuminated some
fundamental judicial presumptions about American society and how
it is constituted that underlay the various opinions. In doing so and
in emphasizing how the judicial rhetoric on groups differs between
the Lochner-era cases on wages and hours legislation and the postBrown cases on gender and gay equality, I have sought to illuminate
the ideal of societal segmentation in judicial arguments. Segmentation arguments are significant, I have argued, as a crucial component
of some of the Court’s more recent, significant rulings on social
groups and equality. Segmentation arguments are also worthy of attention as a historically important and recurrent mode of argument
in American political and legal thought. As discussed in the preceding Part, it remains ambiguous as to what segmentation ideals ultimately imply for American liberalism more broadly. Since both will
remain firmly entrenched within American political and legal
thought for the foreseeable future, the points of conceptual convergence, mutual accommodation, and conceptual divergence between
liberalism and segmentation will undoubtedly continue to shift and
evolve.

